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Abstract
This paper studies a decision maker who chooses monetary bets/investment portfolios
under pure uncertainty. Necessary and sufficient conditions on his preferences over these
objects are provided for his choice behavior to be guided by the maxmin expected value
rule, and therefore to exhibit both “risk neutrality” and ambiguity aversion. This result
is obtained as an extension of a simple re-characterization of de Finetti’s theorem on
maximization of subjective expected value.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we model axiomatically an individual with imprecise probabilistic beliefs over the
possible states of the world, in the tradition of the multiple-priors approach to decision making
under uncertainty that was pioneered by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Our decision maker
chooses from a linear space of monetary bets or investment portfolios and is modelled as ambiguity-
averse as well as “risk-neutral” in the sense that he is assumed to maximize the minimum expected
value according to his set of beliefs. Therefore, his utility function over wealth is assumed to be
linear. Such behavior is relevant and has implications, for instance, in the theoretical analysis of
financial markets with risk-neutral and ambiguity-averse sellers of securities (Araujo, Chateaneuf,
and Faro, 2012, 2015).
Our result is the multi-prior extension of de Finetti’s (1937) classic theorem that characterizes
maximization of subjective expected value. Before stating and proving this result, however, we
also provide a simple re-axiomatization of de Finetti’s model in which his Additivity axiom is
replaced by Independence and Homotheticity. This reformulation allows for the Gilboa-Schmeidler
axiomatic approach to be suitably adapted to the present setting, and also allows for a more direct
comparison between the models of single-prior subjective expected value maximization and multi-
prior minimum expected value maximization.
Our decision maker’s choice domain is X := Rn and % is his weak preference relation on X,
with ≻ and ∼ denoting its asymmetric and symmetric parts that capture strict preference and
indifference, respectively. Generic elements of X are denoted by x, y, z. We write x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi
for all i ≤ n. Moreover, for c ∈ R we write c := (c, . . . , c) ∈ X, and we let
C := {x ∈ X : x = α · 1 for some α ∈ R}.
The decision maker perceives uncertainty that is captured by the state space S := {1, . . . , n}, with
Σ := 2S being the associated algebra of events. To ease notation the pair (S,Σ) will be denoted
simply by S. The vectors in X can be thought of as Savage (1954) acts f : S → R and may
be interpreted as monetary bets or investment portfolios that specify a payoff in each state of
the world. Similarly, elements of C may be thought of as sure bets/investments that assign the
same payoff in all states of the world. This setup of purely subjective uncertainty differs from
the corresponding one in Casadesus-Masanell et al (2000) in that the payoffs there are assumed
to be bounded above and below. Yet, it is embedded as a special case in the setup of Alon and
Schmeidler (2014), as in that paper the authors allow for the outcome set to be any connected
topological space.
2 A Simple Reformulation of de Finetti’s Theorem
Before proceeding to our main task it will be useful first to provide a suitable reformulation of
de Finetti’s (1937) theorem. We begin by stating the axioms that are involved in both the origi-
nal (as established in Gilboa, 2009) and the newly proposed formulation of this fundamental result.
Weak Order
% is complete and transitive.
Monotonicity
For all x, y ∈ X, x ≥ y implies x % y.
1
Non-Triviality
There exist x, y ∈ X such that x ≻ y.
Hemicontinuity
For all x ∈ X, the sets U%(x) := {y ∈ X : y % x} and L%(x) := {y ∈ X : x % y} are closed.
Additivity
For all x, y, z ∈ X, x % y implies x+ z % y + z.
Homotheticity
For all x, y ∈ X and α > 0, x % y implies αx % αy.
Independence
For all x, y, z ∈ X and all α ∈ (0, 1), x % y implies αx+ (1− α)z % αy + (1− α)z.
The first four axioms are standard in the literature. Additivity and its risk-neutrality impli-
cations are discussed in Gilboa (2009). Homotheticity is familiar from consumer theory where it
is known to result in demand functions that are linear in income. Independence is a well-known
normative axiom in both the domain of objective lotteries of von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944)
expected utility theory as well as in the domain of acts of the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) type. An
agent whose preferences violate Independence can in theory be exploited by a “Dutch book”.
Theorem 1 (de Finetti). The following are equivalent:
1. % satisfies Weak Order, Monotonicity, Non-Triviality, Hemicontinuity and Additivity.
2. There exists a unique probability measure p on S such that, for all x, y ∈ X
x % y ⇐⇒ px ≥ py. (1)
3. % satisfies Weak Order, Monotonicity, Non-Triviality, Hemicontinuity, Homotheticity and
Independence.
Proof.
1 ⇒ 2. See pp. 91-92 in Gilboa (2009).
2 ⇒ 3. This is straightforward and omitted.
3 ⇒ 1. It suffices to show that Additivity is satisfied. Suppose x % y. From Independence,
αx+(1−α)z % αy+(1−α)z for all α ∈ (0, 1) and z ∈ X. From Homotheticity, α
1−α
x+z % α
1−α
y+z.
When α = 1
2
, this reduces to x+ z % y + z. 
The addition of the third statement in this result, and the replacement of Additivity by Homoth-
eticity and Independence, allows for clarifying the relationship between the multiple-priors model
that is axiomatized in the next section with de Finetti’s baseline model of subjective expected
value maximization. Such a comparison is not possible with the first statement.
For reasons that are discussed below it will be useful to also consider the implications of the
following strengthening of Monotonicity:
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Strict Monotonicity:
For all x, y ∈ X, x ≥ y and x 6= y implies x ≻ y.
Corollary 2. The following are equivalent:
1. % satisfies Weak Order, Strict Monotonicity, Non-Triviality, Hemicontinuity and Additivity.
2. % satisfies Weak Order, Strict Monotonicity, Non-Triviality, Hemicontinuity, Homotheticity
and Independence.
3. % can be represented as in (1) with a strictly positive probability measure p on S.
3 A Characterization of Maxmin Expected Value
We now proceed to stating suitably modified versions of the two key axioms that were introduced
in Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). We refer the reader to Gilboa (2009) for
intuitive discussions of these axioms.
Certainty Independence:
For all x, y ∈ X, c ∈ C and α ∈ (0, 1), x % y implies αx+ (1− α)c % αy + (1− α)c.
Ambiguity Aversion:
For all x, y ∈ X and all α ∈ (0, 1), x ∼ y implies αx+ (1− α)y % x.
Theorem 3. The following are equivalent:
1. % satisfies Weak Order, Strict Monotonicity, Hemicontinuity, Homotheticity, Certainty Inde-
pendence and Ambiguity Aversion.
2. There exists a compact convex set P of strictly positive probability measures on S such that, for
all x, y ∈ X,
x % y ⇐⇒ min
p∈P
px ≥ min
p∈P
py. (2)
Proof.
Necessity of the axioms is straightforward to establish. The sufficiency proof combines a utility
representation theorem of Debreu (1954) with suitable adaptations of the arguments in the proof
of Lemma 3.3 in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and application of Theorem 2 in Marinacci (1998).
We re-state the latter result as a Lemma:
Lemma (Marinacci). Let (X,≥) be a partially ordered real topological vector space and consider
a functional u : X → R that satisfies the following:
(i) u(0) = 0 and u(x) ≥ u(y) if x ≥ y and x, y ∈ X.
(ii) u(x+ y) ≥ u(x) + u(y) for all x, y ∈ X.
(iii) For some x ∈ X it holds that u(αx+ βx) = αu(x) + βu(x) for all α ≥ 0, β ∈ R and x ∈ X.
Then, there exists a unique convex and weak*-compact set L of positive linear functionals L on X
such that
L(x) = u(x) for all L ∈ L (3)
u(x) = min
L∈L
L(x) for all x ∈ X (4)
3
We start by noticing that Weak Order, Hemicontinuity and the fact that X is a connected
and separable metric space ensure that there exists an ordinally unique continuous utility function
u : X → R such that x % y iff u(x) ≥ u(y) (Debreu, 1954; Theorem I). In the sequel we normalize
such a u so that u(0) = 0 and u(1) = 1.
Clearly, Strict Monotonicity ensures that u(x) ≥ u(y) if x ≥ y, with strict inequality whenever
x 6= y. Thus, condition (i) of the Lemma is satisfied. Moreover, it is a trivial consequence of
Homotheticity that u(αx) = αu(x) for all x ∈ X and α > 0. Thus, u is homogeneous of degree
one.
We will show next that u is C-independent, i.e. that u(x+ c) = u(x) + u(c) for all x ∈ X and
c ∈ C. Let u(2x) := k and define e := 2c ∈ C. Clearly, u(e) = 2c and 2x ∼ k. Therefore, from
Certainty Independence, 1
2
(2x)+ 1
2
e ∼ 1
2
k+ 1
2
e. Repeated application of the homogeneity property
of u now yields
u(x+ c) = u(1
2
k+ c) = 1
2
u(k+ 2c) = 1
2
u(k) + u(c)
= 1
2
k + c = u(x) + c
as required. In view of homogeneity and C-independence of u, condition (iii) of the Lemma is also
satisfied.
We will now show that u(x+ y) ≥ u(x) + u(y) for all x, y ∈ X. Given that u is homogeneous,
it suffices to show that u(1
2
x + 1
2
y) ≥ 1
2
u(x) + 1
2
u(y). If u(x) = u(y), then x ∼ y holds and the
claim readily follows from Ambiguity Aversion. Suppose now, with no loss of generality, that
u(x) > u(y) and let c := u(x)− u(y). Define z := y+ c and observe that, from C-independence of
u, u(z) = u(y + c) = u(y) + c = u(x). Moreover,
u
(
1
2
x+ 1
2
y
)
+ 1
2
c = u
(
1
2
x+ 1
2
z
)
≥ 1
2
u(x) + 1
2
u(z) = 1
2
u(x) + 1
2
u(y) + 1
2
c
where the inequality again follows from Ambiguity Aversion after noting that x ∼ z, while the
equalities follow from homogeneity of u. This shows that condition (ii) of the Lemma is satisfied
too.
Since X = Rn is a real topological vector space that has been endowed with the canonical
partial order ≥, and u satisfies conditions (i)–(iii) of the Lemma, there exists a unique convex
and compact (in the Euclidean topology) set L of positive linear functionals L on X such that (3)
and (4) hold. Moreover, the element(s) x ∈ X in the Lemma coincide with the elements c ∈ C.
Therefore, for each L ∈ L we have L(x) = βL · x for some βL ∈ R
n
+. Moreover, a straightforward
modification in the proof of Theorem 2 in Marinacci (1998) shows that Strict Monotonicity actually
implies that βL ∈ R
n
++, and therefore that L consists of strictly positive linear functionals.
Now, for each βL, define pL ∈ R
n
++ by
piL =
βiL∑n
j=1 β
j
L
.
Clearly, pL is a strictly positive probability measure on S. For each L ∈ L define L̂ by L̂(x) := pL ·x
and let L̂ be the set of all such L̂ ≡ pL. Finally, let P be the convex hull of L̂. Clearly, P is convex
and compact (see, for instance, Corollary 5.33 in Aliprantis and Border, 2006). It remains to be
shown that
min
L∈L
L(x) ≥ min
L∈L
L(y) ⇐⇒ min
p∈P
px ≥ min
p∈P
py.
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But this equivalence must be true because for each p ∈ P , either p can be derived from some L ∈ L
as above, or, from Carathe´odory’s Theorem, p is a convex combination of finitely many elements
of P that can be derived in this way (see, for instance, p. 184 in Aliprantis and Border, 2006). 
The polar opposite of the Ambiguity Aversion axiom that drives the pessimistic behavior cap-
tured by the maxmin choice rule is the following:
Ambiguity Inclination:
For all x, y ∈ X and all α ∈ (0, 1), x ∼ y implies x % αx+ (1− α)y.
It has been known in the literature that followed Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) that, jointly
with the other axioms of the maxmin model (all of which are stated in the Anscombe-Aumann
(1963) setting of choice under uncertainty), Ambiguity Inclination characterizes the optimistic
decision rule that is associated with maxmax expected utility. We note without proof that a similar
conclusion is derivable in the present setting of pure uncertainty with the maxmax expected value
rule.
Corollary 4. The following are equivalent:
1. % satisfies Weak Order, Strict Monotonicity, Hemicontinuity, Homotheticity, Certainty Inde-
pendence and Ambiguity Inclination.
2. There exists a compact convex set P of strictly positive probability measures on S such that for
all x, y ∈ X
x % y ⇐⇒ max
p∈P
px ≥ max
p∈P
py. (5)
4 Degenerate Beliefs, Monotonicity and Indifference
It is worth noting that if Strict Monotonicity is replaced by Monotonicity in the statements of
Theorem 3 and Corollary 4, this would open up the possibility for the set P in (2) and (5) to
contain degenerate priors that assign probability one to some state. In the extreme case where
all n degenerate priors are in P (and hence P = ∆(S), the set of all probability measures on S),
some behaviorally counterintuitive predictions obtain that concern the indifference relation.
Observation. Suppose P = ∆(S). Then, for all x, y ∈ X,
x ∼ y ⇐⇒


min
i≤n
xi = min
i≤n
yi if (2) holds
max
i≤n
xi = max
i≤n
yi if (5) holds
Indeed, suppose (2) holds and let u(x) = minp∈P px. Since P = ∆(S), u(x) = ejx, where ej is the
probability measure that assigns probability 1 to state j, and xj = argmini≤n xi := x. Therefore,
x ∼ y ⇔ u(x) = u(y)⇔ x = y. The argument for (5) is symmetric.
Strict Monotonicity is a sufficient (although clearly not necessary) condition to rule out the
above counter-intuitive predictions. To the extent that more wealth is preferred to less regardless
of which state of the world obtains, this axiom is a behaviorally relevant one too.
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